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Michèle Belot†& Jeroen van de Ven‡
September 18, 2009
Abstract
This study presents evidence from a field experiment on the prevalence of favoritism at
school. Children compete in teams in a tournament in a real effort experiment with two
rounds. They report which group member they prefer to do the task in the second round,
providing them with a small privilege. Using information about their social network and
their individual performance, we are able to identify the importance of friendship ties. We
find that friendships are very important for all age groups. Performance is an important
criterion for the older children, but not for the younger ones. While this suggests that
the children favor their friends, we also find an offsetting effect: children who are favored
increase their subsequent performance. This means that, what looks like favoritism ex ante,
may actually maximize performance ex post.
JEL Classification Numbers: D630, D640, J130, J150
Keywords: Favoritism, performance, social network, friendship ties, children, moral de-
velopment.
1 Introduction
A growing body of controlled field and laboratory experiments shows that "being socially well-
connected" matters in a variety of contexts. For example, Goeree et al. (2007) find that social
distance is the most important determinant of offers in a dictator game among teenagers. They
give substantially more to their friends than to others. Similar results are found for college
students by Mobius et al. (2004) and Brañas-Garza et al. (2006). Interestingly, this tendency to
favor friends or close relations also seems to extend to situations where differences in performance
and merit exist, thereby being a form of unfair favoritism or nepotism. For example, Brandts
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and Sola (2009) find in a laboratory gift exchange setting that subjects allocate more money to
friends than anonymous players, and friends return substantially more, even if the friend has a
lower efficiency1. Bandiera et al. (2009a) provide evidence using an experimental design in a
fruit-picking firm that managers tend to favor workers who are socially close to them when it is
costless to do so but this form of favoritism disappears once it becomes costly to the managers.
Finally, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2009) find evidence of nepotism practices in the recruitment
of top civil servants in Spain.
The implications of favoritism for efficiency are a priori not clear-cut. In principle, there can
be benefits of privileging members from your own social network: Personal relations possibly
overcome informational asymmetries (Granovetter, 1973), and peer pressure effects in networks
can be welfare improving (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2009; Kandel and Lazear, 1992). Also, it
could be that friends who are favored do reciprocate the favor in a way that improves efficiency,
for example, a friend may put more effort in the task for which he has been hired. These
mechanisms are important to stress because it means that in order to establish the true cost of
favoritism, one needs to observe performance ex post, that is, after the favor has been attributed.
The common practice in the literature on discrimination and favoritism practices is to control
for measures of productivity or merit ex ante, thereby ignoring this possible effect. Of course
the main challenge is that one does usually not observe the counterfactual for the productivity
ex post, that is, one does only observe the productivity of those who have been chosen.
This study investigates favoritism practices among school children, in a framed field exper-
imental setting. Schools are fascinating environments for economists to study because perfor-
mance, incentives and social ties interplay on a daily basis. For example, children are regularly
asked to choose between their peers and form teams to compete against each other — typically in
gymnastic lessons. Schools are one of the first places where children socialize and form friendship
ties and, at the same time, are confronted to competitive incentives and systematic mapping of
rewards to performance. This provides an ideal setting to study favoritism practices. Little is
known about how favoritism arises in society and how it develops with age, and understand-
ing the mechanisms through which these practices emerge may provide valuable insights in the
nature of favoritism. Schools are often considered as teaching "life lessons", meaning that the
school experience is likely to shape and affect behavior later on in life. There is a recent growing
1Efficiency is defined as the factor by which the amount sent to the receiver is multiplied.
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interest in the economics literature in the behavior of children in economic decisions (Harbaugh
et al., 2001, 2007; Bernhard et al., 2006; Benenson et al. 2007; Häger et al., 2008). Well-known
games such as the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game have been played with
children with the objective of understanding the emergence of rationality, attitudes and norms
that have been found to play a large role in decisions at adult age, such as altruism, fairness or
strategic considerations. To our knowledge, we are the first to look at the issue of favoritism in
the context of performance.
The study has two main goals: First, we wish to establish whether children tend to favor
their friends over others and whether this differs across age groups. We carry out the experiment
among two age groups of children: younger ones (6-8 years old) and older ones (10-12 years old)).
Second, our experimental design enables us to distinguish between three possible mechanisms
possibly driving favoritism practices: (1) altruism: Children may favor their friends because they
truly want them to be better off, (2) social interaction: Children may favor their friends because
they enjoy interacting with them or (3) reciprocity: Friends who are favored may be more likely
to reciprocate the favor and, for example, put more effort into the task. This latter mechanism
suggests there might be a "flip-side" to favoritism, one that is usually overlooked in empirical
studies.
In order to identify favoritism practices, we carry out a controlled experiment, where per-
formance is precisely measured and observed by everyone, and where the favor clearly provides
a direct benefit to the person who is favored. Children are randomly assigned to teams of four
children within their class and compete in a tournament. Teams are called up sequentially to
participate to the experiment. In a first stage, the four team members are asked to perform the
same task, simultaneously, which is to bring as many balls from one basket to another. This
serves to measure performance (or merit) of every child, which is made observable to all children
in the group. All four children earn a little gift for that first stage, independent of their per-
formance. At the end of this first stage, we ask the children to indicate whom among the three
other team members they would like to do the task a second time, for the benefit of the team.
They do this privately by handing us cards. Children are told that participation in the second
stage is also rewarded with a gift. Thus, the choice provides a clear privilege to the chosen child.
One of the four decisions is then implemented at random, we tell the names of children that are
chosen and by whom, and the task is done a second time. After all teams have been called up,
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we publicly announce to the class who is the winning team.
A number of key aspects in the design allow us to determine the importance of friendship
ties, and uncover the motives behind their importance. First, the random assignment of children
to groups means that we have equally popular children assigned to groups where they have more
or less friends. This enables us to identify the effect of a friendship tie, conditional on popularity.
Second, children can give a friend a privilege by choosing him or her to play in the second round.
This creates a potential trade-off between choosing a friend, or the child who deserves most
to be chosen based on performance. Third, we are able to identify a flip side a favoritism by
comparing the change in performance between the first and second rounds, and see how it relates
to the existence of friendship ties in the team. Finally, we introduce two different treatments to
distinguish between social interaction and other motives. In one treatment, children are asked to
choose one child with whom they would like to do the task again for the benefit of the team, and
in a second treatment, children are asked to choose one child who will perform the task again
on his own for the benefit of the team. By varying whether the choosing child him or herself
also plays in the second round, next to the chosen child, we can determine whether friends are
chosen for the social interaction, i.e., the joy of playing together.
The data show some striking patterns. Choices are extremely biased towards friends. We
find that a child is roughly 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to be selected by another
child if they are friends, controlling for performance. Best friends are even more favored, and are
between 30 and 45 percentage points more likely to be selected than children who are not friends.
This is not just a tie-breaking rule: 60 percent of best friends are nominated despite not being
best performer, against only 30 percent for non-best friends who are best performers in round 1.
While it may not be too surprising that we find strong favoritism among the younger children,
it is interesting to see that this persists when they grow older. On the other hand, we find that
the weight given to past performance is very different for younger and older children. It plays
no role at all for the younger ones, while it plays a large and significant role for older children.
Importantly, performance becomes a distinctive selection criterium in addition to friendship, and
not as a substitute for favoritism; favoritism does not reduce with age but friendship coefficients
remain large.
A novel and interesting finding is that we find a positive side to favoritism in terms of
productivity: Those who are chosen despite not being the one with the best performance, do
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put more effort into the task relative to others. Favoritism is beneficial in terms of performance,
rather than an impediment to the team’s winning chances. Last, we find that in treatments
where children had to select another child for the second round without participating him or
herself in the next round, being friends becomes less important for the selection decision and
completely disappears for older girls. This suggests that favoritism occurs at least partly because
children like to "play with their friends".
Of course the extrapolation of these results to adult age is not straightforward. Nevertheless,
while our results apply to children, the setting has a close resemblance to the labor market, where
people often work in teams, and promotions can depend on social connections. This study sheds
light on how favoritism possibly arises. We find that friendship ties are important already early
on in life. Performance concerns seem to rise with age, but since favoritism is not detrimental to
group performance, this may explain why it subsists over time and carry over to adult age. Thus,
the positive flip side of favoritism may be the very reason why it survives and persists until adult
age. However, it is not clear that the positive flip side is present in all settings. Bandiera et al.
(2009a) find that favoritism diminishes once performance incentives are provided to managers.
Our design imposes conditions that may be key for favoritism not to be detrimental: First, the
nature of friendships is specific: school children interact with each other on a daily basis and
are embedded in a long-term social network. Second, we chose a task where effort is adjustable
and the favor could be reciprocated in a way that is beneficial for the team (as opposed to a
private benefit to the person who has attributed the favor). These factors may be key to our
results. For example, if production is mostly determined by the ability of its members, favoritism
towards friends may result in an inefficient allocation of talent, and reduced productivity. On the
other hand, if effort is the most important determinant of productivity, an inefficient allocation
of talent may be outweighed by a higher overall effort in teams composed of friends. If these
mechanisms are still present a adult age, this may have interesting implications for the discretion
given to managers to pick their team. 2 .
The economic significance of favoritism overall is best illustrated, but not limited to, behavior
in various types of firms and organizations. A large number of people do their work in teams.
2 In this light, the practice of, for instance, American Airlines not to give any discretion to management in the
assignment of flight attendants to routes, may have been suboptimal. As Milgrom (1988) argues, the airline cares
little about the allocation. This can be interpreted as saying that ability is not of major importance for this type
of work, in which case it may be optimal to form teams of friends, rather than allocate on the basis of factors
such as seniority.
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Such teams share at least two features with our experimental design: first, the team has a
common objective, with a potential for a free-rider problem, and second, members of the team
often have an influence on who will be hired or promoted to become their team member. Our
results show that the free rider problem is diminished if the team is composed of members of the
same social network. Reminiscent of this fact is the success of Japanese firms, often attributed to
team spirit. Perhaps this is the case because compensation is for a large part based on the firm’s
success, but Kandel and Lazear suggest that another possibility may be peer effects, and they
note that "Partnerships are often formed among friends or family members. Despite the free-rider
problems (...) partners often put in long hours and exert substantial effort. One explanation is
that when partners are friends or relatives, empathy is strong ..." (Kandel and Lazear, 1992, p.
808).
The setup of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly reviews the related
literature. Section 3 describes the experimental setup and data construction. We then discuss
results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on discrimination goes back to Becker (1971), who models pure taste-
based discrimination as a price that individuals are willing to pay not to interact with certain
groups. Goldberg (1982), showed that if some firms have a preference for nepotism, they can
survive in competitive markets, and discrimination can be sustained over time. Prendergast and
Topel (1996) study the implications favoritism has on optimal incentive schemes, showing that
it is not always harmful.
There is a large empirical literature on discriminatory and favoritism practices among adults.
The challenge of this literature has been to establish whether a preferential treatment is unfair or
not, because objective measures of performance or merit are rarely available. While there is now
a fair amount of evidence of discriminatory practices based on objective characteristics, such as
gender, race,or ingroup members3 , the evidence on "nepotism" practices is much thinner. This
literature faces a second challenge, because typically information on social ties is not available
either.
3Falk and Zehnder (2007), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) are examples of recent studies providing experimental
evidence of favoritism based on race. See Charness et al. (2007) and Bernhard et al. (2006) for recent findings
on ingroup favoritism.
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A recent exception are the studies Bandiera et al. (2009a, 2009b) who provide field experi-
mental evidence on favoritism practices within a fruit-picking firm. Workers pick fruit under the
supervision of a manager (who allocates them to specific rows in the field) and are rewarded with
a piece-rate. They argue that managers can favor workers by allocating them to better, more
productive rows. They find that the performance (and therefore pay) of fruit-picking workers
who are socially close to the managers is higher when the manager’s pay is not linked to the
worker’s performance than when it is (Bandiera et al., 2009a). This suggests that managers are
likely to favor their friends when it is costless to do so, but favoritism disappears when it becomes
costly. Bandiera et al. (2009b) find evidence that a worker’s productivity is higher when she
works alongside friends who are more able than her, but lower when these friends are less able
than herself. They suggest that this is mainly because friends like to socialize, so their produc-
tivity is adjusted to stay in close physical proximity. Note that there are two key differences with
our environment. First, in our experiment, children have little time to socialize, and this makes
it less likely to be a primary factor (we will test for this). Secondly, in our experiments there
is team production, so that there are positive externalities of exerting more effort. By contrast,
there are no externalities in terms of productivity among workers in the experiment by Bandiera
et al., so in their set up reciprocity in this form is excluded.
Our study also relates to the literature on the moral development of children. Early contri-
butions in psychology include Piaget (1932/1965) and Kohlberg (1970). By means of interviews,
they studied the attitudes of children regarding justice and identified successive stages in the
moral development of the child. Building on their work, a number of experiments have been
designed to study altruism and fairness among children. A first group of studies is based on
simple dictator games. The typical finding is that children become more fair (egalitarian) or
altruistic as they become older (for recent studies, see Fehr et al. (2008), Harbaugh et al. (2007)
and Benenson et al. (2007)). A second group of experiments introduces differences in merit and
performance across children within a dictator game setting. The standard design (Leventhal and
Anderson (1970)) is such that one child is asked to allocate rewards between herself and another
child, after having performed a task and being told how well she performed in comparison to
the other child. The pattern seems to be that allocation goes from non-work related for children
up to 5 years old to ordinal equity — the order of rewards maps the order of performance — for
6 to 12 years old and finally to proportional equity (rewards proportional to merit) for older
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children and adults. Lerner (1974) designed an experiment where children take on the role of
independent advisor about the allocation of rewards between two other children. He also finds
that younger children put more weight on equality and older children on equity (rewards propor-
tional to merit). Hook (1978) argues that these differences may be due to differences in cognitive
ability, in particular in calculating the rewards associated with a proportionality norm.
Overall, these “allocation” studies show that fairness considerations are present among chil-
dren, but all these studies are in anonymous settings. The children know nothing more about
the other children than their performance in the task. This study is first to investigate the allo-
cation of a "privilege" in a situation where the decision maker has information both about the
performance and identity of the subjects involved.
3 Experimental Setup
3.1 Recruitment and background characteristics
We were granted access to 9 primary schools in and near the city of Mons, Belgium. We targeted
all children from classes one and two (aged between 6 and 8 years ) and classes five and six
(aged 11 to 12). All children whose parents gave written permission were selected to participate.
Parents and teachers were informed about the basic outlines of the experiment. Children were
not informed about the task prior to the experiment.
One month prior to the study, in April 2008, we obtained background characteristics about
the children and their social network from three sources. First, we asked the children themselves
to list their friends, beginning with their best friends. Secondly, we asked the parents for personal
data about their children such as birthdays, length, number of siblings. Parents were also asked
to list friends of the children, and to indicate how often they meet outside school. Finally, the
teachers made a list of most popular children, and gave information about test scores.
Children with permission from their parents to participate were then grouped in groups of
four. The group formation was done as follows: We took the pile of questionnaires containing the
friendship information and shuﬄed them randomly. We then took the first three questionnaires
and assigned them to a team, then we took the first questionnaire and went through the pile
sequentially to pick the first questionnaire we encounterd with the name of a child mentioned by
the first child assigned to the group. This ensured that we had at least one friendship tie in the
group.
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The experiment involved 64 complete groups of 4 (256 children).
3.2 Description of the game
Groups were called one by one from their class, most often during their physical education. We
told them that they were part of a tournament in their class, and that the objective was to
win the tournament. We then explained the game to them. Every child had its own color of
balls. They were asked to bring as many balls as possible from one basket to another within 30
seconds. We showed them what they were supposed to do. This task has several advantages:
It is simple to understand, individual and team performance is easily measured, transparent to
all team members, and mainly depends on effort. Also, the pilot showed that children enjoy
performing the task.
For the younger children, the distance between the baskets was 2 meters, and 3 meters
for the older children. We chose different distances to ensure the similarity in distributions of
performance. This is important if we want to compare behavior across age groups. They all
performed the task simultaneously. They were only allowed to take one ball at the time, and
any ball bouncing out of the basket was not counted (as to prevent throwing).
After 30 seconds, we shouted "stop" and counted the balls in front of them, one by one, and
wrote down the number visibly for all on a scoreboard, and read the scores aloud. We then
added the scores together and announced the team score for that first round. We told them that
they all received a small gift (independent of their performance in the first round), and that we
would play a second (and last) round.
3.3 Treatments
We implemented two treatments:
Treatment "Together ": We told the children that two of the four children would do the task
again for the team, and earn a second little gift for that. They were asked to choose one other
child who, in addition to him or herself, would be entitled to perform the task again.
Treatment "Alone": We told them that only one of them would do the task again for the
team and would earn a second little gift. They were asked to choose one child (other than her
or himself) who would be entitled to perform the task again.
The choices of the children were elicited as follows. They each received three cards, with
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chooses
+
chooses
+
chooses
+
Figure 1: Example of choice cards for player ’white’ (treatment SO).
their own color and the three colors of the other players (Together-treatment) or just the colors
of the other players (Alone-treatment). They selected one card in private, and handed it over
to us. Figure 1 shows an example of the three cards provided to one of the children (who was
assigned the color white). We gave them about a minute to make their choice and collected the
cards. We then randomly picked one, showed the chosen card and read it allowed, e.g. "White
chooses White and Yellow" in the Together treatment and "White Chooses Yellow" in the Alone
treatment. Thus, in both treatments, children were informed of who had chosen them. This
procedure was simple to understand for the children and allowed us to infer preferences from all
4 children.
The child chosen to play the second round is our main variable of interest. At the point
of making the choice, the children see the performance of each of them on the board. We can
therefore study whether, conditional on performance, a friend is more likely to be chosen than
someone else. Our definition of favoritism focuses on the act of systematically favoring friends,
conditionally on performance and merit. Thus, the "unfair" character of favoritism lies in the
systematic aspect of the preferential treatment. In principle, the fact that a friend is chosen
among two people with equal performance may not appear as "unfair". We are interested in
the systematic aspect of such practice, which will result in friends being better off on average
than others. Thus, our perspective of favoritism is very much focused on the side of those who
are favored and disfavored. This definition of favoritism encompasses both costly and costless
favoritism. Favoritism is costly if it translates into reduced performance and therefore reduced
probability of winning. We discuss in Section XX whether favoritism is costly or not.
The difference between the two treatments should capture the consumption value associated
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with performing the task together with the chosen person. Arguably, the value of interacting
with the other person is relatively limited or minimal. This needs to be kept in mind when we
come to the results.
3.4 Incentives
The game was framed as a tournament, the children were explicitly told that they formed a team
and were competing against other teams in the class. They did not know how many teams there
were (since we needed parental consent of the children, not all children in the class participated
and we did not reveal until the end who was participating and how many teams there were).
Children received one or two gifts, depending on whether they participated to the first round
or to both rounds. The gifts they received were decorated gums and pencils for the young
children, and neon markers for the older ones, wrapped in a colorful paper bag. At no point did
we specify the nature of the gift to make sure that differences in valuations for these gifts would
not influence their behavior and selection decision. Nevertheless, one important characteristic of
these gifts is their indivisibility.
Our main interest is to document how children weigh performance and friendship in the
selection decision. We wanted to remain as close as possible to the type of situations with which
children are regularly confronted, using incentives they are familiar with, that is "points" and the
nomination of a "winner" at the end. We did not attach an additional reward to winning. Our
experience with the children showed that they were very motivated and cared about winning in
itself (for example, some children came back with a calculator to make sure that we had added
up the points of their team correctly; they were very keen to know who had won the tournament
and the winning team cheered when they heard the result). We will come back to this aspect
later on when we describe the results.
We did depart from the "usual" setting though by attaching a gift to participation. Being
allowed to play a second time could be considered as a privilege in itself and our experience
taught us that children were very keen on playing a second time. Nevertheless, the task requires
effort, so we chose to attach a gift to participation in each round to make sure that, indeed, being
selected would provide a clear privilege.
The scheme has the virtue of being very simple to understand for even very young children.
In particular, there is no cognitive difficulty in identifying the fair allocation. It is very easy
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to identify who is the best performing child - the most obvious candidate for selection. Thus,
differences in behavior according to age are unlikely to be driven by differences in cognitive
ability.
3.5 Sources of favoritism
We designed the experiment to distinguish between possible mechanisms driving favoritism prac-
tices.
• Altruism or warm glow Children may feel good about favoring their friends. This has many
gradations, ranging from purely altruistic reasons, to a warm glow from the act itself of
being nice towards friends (see Andreoni, 1990).
• Social interaction Children may select their friends because they find it pleasant to play in
company with them, rather than with children that are not their friends, just as much as
most people may prefer to work in teams with colleagues they appreciate.
• Reciprocity Children may pick their friends because they expect their friends to put more
effort into the task.
Because we observe performance in the second round as well, we can observe whether those
who are privileged do put more effort into the task, and thereby identify possible reciprocity
effects. More precisely, we can compare the change in performance between the first and second
round and see whether it differs for those who have a friendship tie with the child choosing and
those who do not.
Our treatments Together and Alone are designed to identify the value of social interaction.
In the Alone-treatment there is no option to play together in the next round. If enjoying the
company is the main motivation, therefore, friends should no longer be favored in this treatment.
By contrast, if altruism or reciprocity is the main motivation to favor friends, the friendship
coefficients should be of similar magnitude in the Alone treatment as in the Together treatment.
In addition to the above mechanisms, it is also possible that some forms of reciprocity occur
after the experiment was completed. Friends that are chosen may return this favor later on, or
may retaliate for not being chosen. Furthermore, those chosen could possibly act in a way that
strengthens the friendship afterwards. We cannot observe to what extent such factors play a
role.
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3.6 Measure of friendship
Children and parents were asked to list friends in order of importance. Not all children returned
the questionnaire, but since we needed parental authorization we always have answers from
parents. Whenever data from children is missing, we used answers from their parents.4 We
constructed a measure of friendship based on the list of friends provided by each child. For each
child, we identify the children listed with a dummy variable "friend". Then we coded the listed
children according to the order they were listed: The first child (best friend) was coded as "friend
1", the children listed 2d to 4th were coded as "friend 2-4" and we coded all the children named
after that as "friend5+".
3.7 Age and favoritism
We study two groups of children; younger children (age 6-7) and older ones (11-12). Since the
experimental design is extremely simple, we consider two possible explanations why favoritism
practices may change with age:
• Friendship quality: Friendships surely change and grow over time, and we could expect
that the friendships of older children are more stable, better established and therefore,
stronger.
• Fairness considerations: As we have discussed earlier, younger children tend to be more
selfish than older ones. It could be that their conception of fairness is different from older
ones.
4 Results
We first present some summary statistics of the experiment (Table 1). We had 256 participants,
of which 119 were girls (46%), and 137 (53%) were young children. The average number of balls
brought to the other basket in round 1 is close to 10, and ranges from 5 to 13. The average
performance in round 1 is very similar across all groups. Girls tend to do slightly worse (Mann-
Whitney test, Z = 5.708, p = 0.000), by around .3 balls. Older children also do only slightly
worse, so it seems that the difference in distance between the age groups (1 meter) makes up for
the difference in length and speed across ages.
4For the cases where we have information from more than one source, we did not find different results.
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Table 1 also reports the average number of times that a child is listed as a friend by a group
member. The average is .96 ranging from no friends in the group to being friends of all other
group members. Girls are somewhat more often listed as a friend than boys, but this difference
is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, Z = -1.076, p = 0.282).
Table 1 - Summary Statistics
category average st.dev. min. max. N. obs.
Performance round 1
All 9.94 1.37 5 13 256
Boys 10.11 1.51 5 13 137
Girls 9.76 1.16 7 12 119
Young 10.07 1.42 5 13 136
Old 9.81 1.29 6 13 120
Number of friends in the group
All .96 .88 0 3 256
Boys .91 .87 0 3 137
Girls 1.03 .89 0 3 119
Young .96 .83 0 3 136
Old .97 .93 0 3 120
4.1 Selection decision
We now study the determinants of the selection decision. Since there are four children in the
team, the benchmark probability for being chosen is 1/3. Figure 2 shows the frequency of being
chosen according to performance (top panel) and friendship (bottom panel). We have pooled
the data from both treatments. If we consider performance first, we see a striking difference
between younger and older children. Among young children, best performers are only slightly
more likely to be selected. Performance plays a much stronger role among older children. The
best performing child is selected in 50% of the cases, while the second, third and fourth have
roughly equal probabilities of being chosen. The bottom panel shows the relationship between
friendship and selection. Friends are selected in more than 50% of the cases, while non-friends are
chosen only in 20% (younger children) and 25% of the cases (older children). Not surprisingly,
this difference is significant at any conventional level for both groups. It thus appears that
performance becomes an important factor in the selection choices, replacing ’noisy’ factors when
children get older, and not displacing any friendship effects.
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We now turn to a regression analysis of these findings. We estimate the probability that child
i is chosen by child j. We estimate a linear probability model:
P (choseni,j = 1) = α+ βRanki + δDisti,j + θXi + υi + εij,
where Rank is a set of dummy variables identifying the performance ranking in the group
excluding the choosing child (1, 2, or 3); Dist is a set of dummy variables identifying the friendship
distance between the choosing child j and child i; andXi is a vector of attributes (such as gender).
We wish to investigate whether, conditional on performance, friends are treated differently than
others. The null hypothesis of no favoritism corresponds to δ = 0.
Of course, friendship ties are not randomly formed, such that we cannot claim at this stage
that we identify a causal effect. In particular, it could be that children who are better able
are more likely to be nominated by others as their friend. These popular children will all else
equal be more likely to have a low social distance with anyone in the group (even if the group is
randomly formed). If popularity is correlated with ability, the estimate of δ could partly capture
unobserved ability. We discuss this issue in detail after presenting first results.
We first describe the results where we group the data from both treatments by age. Table
2 reports the results for the young children. We first estimate the probability of being chosen
by another child to play the second round depending on one’s performance. The results confirm
what we have documented earlier: For younger ones (col (1)), performance plays no role in the
selection decision. The coefficients of Rank are small and insignificant. For older ones (col. 4)),
there is a clear and strong relationship between performance in the first round and selection.
Not being ranked first lowers the probability of being selected by around 30 percentage points
compared to the best performer. Thus, older children are more likely to select another child
based on merit. One possible explanation for this is that performance in the first round is a
better predictor of performance in the second round for older children. The correlation between
performance in the first and second round is indeed slightly higher for older children than for
younger ones (.50 versus .39). However, there is still a strong positive correlation between the
two, even for younger children, so it does not explain the results entirely.
Col (2) and (5) control for a dummy variable for whether there is any friendship relationship
between the child and the choosing child (identified by the choosing child). The coefficient of
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friendship is highly significant and very sizeable, for both older and younger children. Being a
friend of someone increases the probability of being chosen by 16 percentage points for older
children and 25 percentage points for younger ones. Col (3) and (6) includes dummies capturing
the degree of friendship closeness with the choosing child. We distinguish between best friend
(Friend 1 ), second best to fourth best friends (Friend 2-4 ), and fifth best friend or more (Friend
5+). We find that all degrees of friendship matter for young children, while mainly the best
friend matters for older children. That is, the closeness of the friendship has a stronger effect on
selection for older children than for younger ones. One possible explanation for this difference
could be that friendships at an older age are stronger and more stable than friendships at a
younger age.
In summary, younger children seem to base their choice mainly on friendships, while older
children put more weight on performance, although best friends are more likely to be privileged
too.
Table 2 - Probability of being chosen for the second round
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
–- younger children –- –– older children ––
Rank 2 -.052 -.038 -.045 -.313*** -.313*** -.290***
(.055) (.053) (.053) (.059) (.060) (.058)
Rank 3 -.076 -.084 -.097* -.266*** -.279*** -.275***
(.058) (.056) (.056) (.064) (.066) (.062)
Friend .251*** .163***
(.049) (.051)
Friend 1 (best) .330*** .438***
(.094) (.091)
Friend 2-4 .226*** .083
(.075) (.065)
Friend 5+ .207*** .019
(.074) (.072)
Gender_p -.015 -.016 -.022 -.078 -.081 -.077
(.046) (.044) (.045) (.050) (.050) (.048)
constant .360*** .271*** .285*** .521*** .478*** .467***
(.038) (.036) (.041) (.049) (.055) (.053)
N children 408 408 408 360 360 360
R2 .005 .07 .07 .11 .16 .17
Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered by child. Performance rank excludes
choosing player. Data pooled over treatments. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
As we discussed above, one could expect that friendships may be correlated with unobserved
ability, popular individuals are more likely to have been nominated by someone in their group
and could also be better able. This is particularly a concern because our measure of performance
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is just one draw. Children may know better who is most qualified to play the second round. We
can investigate this possibility in three ways: First, we investigate how the friendship effect varies
when we do or do not control for performance in the first round. If friendships are (positively)
correlated with ability, then we would expect to see that the friendship effect differs (becomes
stronger) when we do not control for performance in the first round, as they will pick up the
performance effect. Second, we have information on the total number of nominations a child
received in his class. Because of the random assignment of children to groups, some equally
popular children will end up in groups with more or less friends. Thus, we can control for
popularity and see whether the friendship effect subsists. Last, we have information on physical
education grades for a sample of the older children and can examine how the friendship effect
changes when we control for grade.
Table 3 presents the linear probability model estimates controlling for the rank in the first
round (columns (1) and (3)) and not controlling for the rank in the first round (columns (2)
and (4)). The point estimates of the friendship effect change hardly at all, compared to those
of Table 2. There seems to be very little correlation between our measure of social distance and
performance in the first round.
Table 4 presents linear probability estimates controlling for the child’s overall popularity and
grade in physical education. In columns (1) and (3), we only distinguish best performers - leaving
most room for a possible bias in the friendship effect, and replicate the results of Table 2 for
young and old children respectively. Columns (2) and (4) include the number of nominations5 ,
where missing values for nominations are replaced by the mean, and a dummy is included for
missing values. We find that overall popularity has no direct effect on the probability of being
chosen, and the other coefficients are not affected. Finally, we find that a higher grade in physical
education (measured on a scale from 0 to 10, missing values replaced by the mean) does increase
the probability of being chosen, but the effect seems completely orthogonal to the friendship
effect (column (5)). Thus, we conclude that the effects we have documented earlier are not
driven by a correlation between unobserved ability and friendships.
The results so far suggest that indeed, there is a form of favoritism whevery, conditional on
performance, friends are systematically more likely to be chosen than others. This implies a
5We included this variable only for groups where more than 50% of the children in the class participated to
the experiment. For the others, we subsituted the value by the mean number of nominations, such that we can
estimate the effects of the other variables on the whole sample, controlling for the effect of nominations.
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direct benefit for friends in comparison to others. We cannot tell yet, however, whether this
preferential treatment is costly to the discriminator in terms of reduced team performance and
reduced probability of winning.
Table 3 - Probability of being chosen for the second round
(1) (2) (3) (4)
– younger children – – older children –
Friend 1 (best) .330*** .313*** .438*** .457***
(.094) (.091) (.091) (.091)
Friend 2-4 .226*** .228*** .083 .123
(.075) (.074) (.065) (.072)
Friend 5+ .207*** .210*** .019 .079
(.074) (.074) (.072) (.071)
N children 408 408 360 360
controlling for performance Yes No Yes No
R2 .07 .06 .17 .08
Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered by child. Performance rank excludes
choosing player. Data pooled over treatments. *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
Table 4 - Probability of being chosen for the second round (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- younger children - ––- older children ––-
Best performer .066 .066 .316*** .315*** .292***
(.045) (.045) (.053) (.053) (.050)
Friend 1 (best) .324*** .325*** .439*** .437*** .423***
(.093) (.093) (.092) (.093) (.088)
Friend 2+ (not best) .219*** .220*** .083 .075 .124**
(.056) (.059) (.058) (.060) (.055)
Number of nominations -.001 .009
(.013) (.017)
Missing nomination dummy† -.008 -.001
(.045) (.095)
Grade in physical education .140***
(.047)
Missing grade dummy†† .022
(.050)
constant .210*** .219*** .129*** .095 -1.027***
(.032) (.061) (.031) (.090) (.385)
N children 136 136 116 116 116
R2 .07 .07 .18 .18 .18
Notes: Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered by child. Data pooled over treatments. *** denotes
significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. †Missing values nominations replaced with mean value.
††Missing grades physical education replaced with mean grade.
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Figure 3: Performance in Round 1 and 2, split by best performers (rank 1), and not best
performers (ranks 2, 3 and 4).
4.2 Why are friends favored?
We now investigate the possible mechanisms driving favoritism. First, we investigate whether
there is a possible flip side to favoritism, that is, whether those who are favored put more effort
into the task subsequently. This will also enable us to assess whether favoritism is costly to
the discriminator or not. Second, we investigate whether children value social interaction by
comparing their behavior across the two treatments.
4.2.1 Reciprocity
The previous analysis established that children tend to favor their friends, conditionally on
performance in the first round. We now investigate how performance changes between the first
and second round. Figure 3 shows how performance changes across rounds depending on the
ranking of the children in the first round, using the sample of children who play both rounds.
Obviously, the best performing children have a higher performance in the first round. But in
the second round the gap between best performers and the other children shrinks substantially.
Performance remains very similar in the second round for the first ranked children, but improves
significantly for the lower ranked children. Thus, the picture is a very different one depending
on whether one looks at performance ex ante or ex post.
How can we explain this improvement in performance ex post for low achievers? The analysis
of the previous section showed that the choice of a friend was unlikely to be driven by private
information about ability, since it appeared uncorrelated with any other measure of ability or
performance. A second possible explanation is regression to the mean: low achievers have more
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room to improve than high achievers, through learning or otherwise. A third explanation is a
positive flip side of favoritism, i.e. those who have been favored could reciprocate the favor by
providing more effort. We now investigate in more detail the relationship between friendship ties
and the change in performance.
If the improvement in performance is entirely due to regression to the mean, then the im-
provement in performance should be independent on whether there is a friendship tie between
the choosing and chosen child. Note that the same is true if the choice was driven by private
information about ability. If children were indeed choosing the child they believe is the most able
(and is not necessarily the best performer in the first round), then the analysis in the previous
section shows that there is no reason to expect that this child should be a friend, and so there is
no reason why we should expect the improvement in performance to be different for friends than
others (conditioning on performance in the first round).
Let y∗j denote the expected output of child j. We wish to test whether y
2
j (friendi,j =
1|y1j ) > y
2
j (friendi,j = 0|y
1
j ), that is, whether friends put in more effort in the second round in
comparison to non friends, conditional on their performance in the first round. Table 5 shows
the results.
We find a striking pattern: Conditional on performance in round 1, both younger and older
children are significantly more likely to improve their performance if they have been chosen by
their friend, more precisely, by their closest friend. Clearly, there is also an effect of regression to
the mean, those who performed better in the first round have lower improvements in performance
across rounds. But there is also strong evidence of a positive flip side of favoritism, something
that one can only uncover if one can observe performance ex post. This effect is particularly
noteworthy given that we have given no additional incentives to winning the tournament than
the mere "honour of winning".
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Table 5 - Difference in performance between rounds and friendship
Younger Older
Friend 1 (best) 1.481 .584
(.343)*** (.308)*
Friend 2+ (not best) .338 -.220
(.246) (.237)
Performance round 1 -.627 -.539
(.095)*** (.065)***
Constant 6.553 5.727
(.997)*** (.684)***
N children 87 86
R-squared .43 .49
Notes: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%
The question is whether this flip side outweighs the negative effect of not choosing the best
performer in the first round. Table 6 reports the means of performance, split by rank in round 1
and the number of friends (pooled over degree and treatment). We see that average performance
in round 2 is highest for the group with many friends that are ranked low in round one (11.3
balls).
Preventing favoritism may result in the selection of higher ability people, but those who
are chosen because of friendship ties increase their effort in such a way that it compensates for
their lower ability. This insight shows that favoritism may not be that costly after all, from
the point of view of the discriminator. Also, if this mechanism is as important as our results
suggest, increasing the incentives to win the competition will not necessarily change the selection
decision.
Table 6 - Average Performance
round 2 by rank and friends
rank round 1
1 or 2 3 or 4
0 or 1 friends
10.67
(1.25)
10.14
(.89)
2 or 3 friends
10.87
(1.27)
11.33
(1.52)
Notes: Means, standard in parentheses.
Grouped data over degree and treatments.
4.2.2 Friendships and interaction value
As a final exercise, we investigate the extent to which favoring friends is related to a value of
playing together. Our treatments enable us to isolate a value of interaction, which is to do
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the task again with the friend. Of course this social interaction is very limited, since children
perform the task independently. Nevertheless, comparing their behavior in these two treatments
may shed some light on whether children value social interaction at all.
We estimate the following model:
P (choseni,j = 1) = α+ βRanki + δDistij + γDistij × treatment+ θXi + υi + εij ,
where we interact the friendship dummy variables with the treatment dummy (0 for Together
treatment, 1 for Alone treatment). The importance of social interaction is measured by δ − γ.
Table 7 reports the results. Because the coefficients on distance were similar for 2-4 friends
and 5 or more friends, we group them together. Column (1) shows the estimates for younger
children. As before, performance seems of little relevance to the young children, while friends
are much more likely to be chosen, with the highest coefficient for best friends. The interaction
terms of friends and treatment Alone are small and not significant.
Column (2) reports estimates for older children. We find a large negative coefficient for the
interaction term best friend and treatment Alone. Thus, best friends are much more likely to be
chosen in the Together treatment, but the effect is weaker in the Alone treatment.
As a final exercise, we investigate how these results differ across gender, as it is well-known
from psychologists that boys and girls play differently (see for example McCoby (2002)). The
evidence suggests that boys care more about winning and think it is good to be part of a winning
team, especially older ones. Girls, on the other hand, are generally more interested in building
alliances, and often regard winning as bad because someone has to lose and might feel hurt or
upset. The results are presented in columns 3 and 4. We do indeed find different effects for boys
and girls. Boys do not select friends significantly more often, although the coefficient for best
friend is sizeable (column 3) There is also no indication of a treatment effect. Girls are much
more likely to select their best friend in the Together treatment, but not in the Alone treatment:
the coefficient of best friend (.545) is offset by the negative interaction term (-.615). Thus, even
in this context where the value of interaction is relatively limited, we do find that this is driving
entirely the decision of older girls to pick a friend.
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Table 7 - Probability of being chosen for the second round
(1) (2) (3) (4)
young older older older
all boys girls
Rank 2 -.046 -.307*** -.316*** -.329***
(.054) (.060) (.083) (.087)
Rank 3 -.094 -.302*** -.370*** -.225**
(.057) (.063) (.081) (.101)
Friend 1 (best) .345*** .583*** .281 .545***
(.109) (.126) (.187) (.167)
Friend 2-5 .219*** .091 .087 .063
(.065) (.089) (.109) (.104)
Friend 1 & treatment 2 (Alone) -.051 -.278* .032 -.615***
(.197) (.166) (.221) (.202)
Friend 2-5 & treatment 2 (Alone) -.008 -.016 -.162 .080
(.116) (.100) (.122) (.144)
Gender_p -.019 -.085* -.267*** -.067
(.044) (.050) (.073) (.082)
constant .284*** .484*** .641*** .403***
(.041) (.055) (.086) (.077)
N children 405 335 161 174
R2 .19 .12 .31 .17
Notes: standard errors clustered by childid_p. Performance rank excludes choosing player
*** denotes significant at 1% level, ** at 5%, and * at 10%.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides unique field evidence on the practice of favoritism among children. It is
one of the few studies with information on individual performance and the social network. In
a controlled field experiment, we are able to identify the importance and development of a
favoritism among children, as well as the underlying motives.
We find that both younger and older children tend to favor their friends over others. Perfor-
mance, by contrast, plays no role at all among younger children, but is very important among
older children. Goeree et al. (2007) also find that children are more generous towards their
friends in a dictator game. Our results show that this effect persists in a situation where differ-
ences in merit exist and friends do not necessarily "deserve" to be treated better than others.
Children attribute a substantial weight to friendships.
An interesting and novel finding is that there seems to be a positive flip side to favoritism.
What may appear as favoritism based on indicators of performance ex ante turns out to be
beneficial for the group as a whole when we take performance ex post into account. Friends who
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are chosen despite not being the best performers, put in more effort in the second round than
all others. Thus, preventing favoritism may come at the cost of future performance, if people
perform better around their friends than other people. We can identify some key assumptions
for our results to have relevance. First, productivity has to depend for a relatively important
part on efforts compared to ability. Only if higher efforts can compensate for lower ability, can
it be beneficial to select friends rather than the person with the highest ability. Secondly, there
have to be externalities present in the production technology. Reciprocation by increased effort
is only beneficial if it helps the other team members. Thirdly, more high-powered incentives do
not necessarily reduce favoritism. Only insofar as increased efforts do not outweigh less talent,
will giving high-powered incentives help to reduce favoritism. Finally, note that in the setting
we studied, reciprocity takes the form of increased efforts in the productive task. More generally,
there may be scope to reciprocate favors in other ways, possibly leading to nonproductive uses
of resources.
Finally, while our results apply to children, the setting has a close resemblance to the labor
market, where people often work in teams, and promotions can depend on social connections.
From that perspective, the emergence of social ties may play a critical role in determining chances
later on in life. Importantly, friendships do not appear to distort ineffieciently the allocation of
resources, but they do benefit particularly those who are well embedded in social networks. Thus,
it seems important to understand why and when do differences in network positions emerge.
Conti et al. (2009) find that the early family and school environment play a crucial role in
shaping friendship networks. This type of research should uncover valuable policy-relevant routes
to explore in the light of the large disparities existing in society.
6 Appendix: Instructions and Questionnaires
6.0.3 Instructions
[Translated from French. Instructions were given verbally] welcome to you all. We organized
a small tournament in your class. You are the [number] team. The objective is to win the
tournament. Every one of you will get its own color. The objective is to bring as many balls
from one basket to another within 30 seconds. There are two rules. First, you can only take one
ball at the time. Secondly, you are not allowed to throw balls. If you throw a ball, it is likely
that it will bounce out of the baskets, and it will not count. Now please stand behind your color
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of balls. Are you ready? [task done, scores written down and read aloud] Well done. For this,
you will all receive a small gift at the end. Now we will play a second round, where you can earn
an additional gift, but this time only to a few and play. This is the last round we play. I will give
you cards with the colors of the other players. Please select the card with the color of the other
player you would like to play with in private, and hand it over to me. After I collected all cards,
I will shuﬄe them and pick one. [Cards shuﬄed in front of them and one randomly selected].
Okay, so [names and colors of 2 players] will play a second-round. The other two players will
watch. [task done, end score reported]. That was it. You will receive your gifts later today.
Thank you for participating!
Questionnaire for children Name
Class
Name of teacher
Who are your closest friends in the class? (by order of preference)
Who are your favorite play-mates in the class?
Which of your schoolmates do you see regularly outside the school?
Questionnaire for parents Name
Date of birth
Address
Year of study
Height
Weight
How far do you live from the school? (in km)
When did you join this school?
Profession of father
Profession of mother
Number of brothers
Number of sisters
Does he/she wear glasses?
Does he/she wear braces?
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Figure 4: Map of Mons and surroundings with the school location Inset: Belgium with the region
of Mons highlighted.
Position in the sibship: (1) for eldest, (2) for second etc.
Who are his closest friends? (by order of preference)
Which schoolmates does he/she regularly outside the school?
How often does he/she interact with other children (other than siblings) outside the school?
1) daily; 2) at least once a week, 3) at least once a month, 4) rarely, 5) never
Questionnaire for teacher Who are the most popular children in the class?
Who are the least popular children in the class?
Who are the children who received disciplinary measures in the last three months?
Average grades in physical education of all children
Average grades in mathematics of all children
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